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A Rock and a Hard Place  Crrent U.S.  trade  policyis
domestic  policy  first  and trade
policy  only  secondarily.  The
The Two Faces  importance  of trade remedies
of U.S.  Trade Policy  Toward Korea  and  301^in U.S.  policy
means  that it is no longer
most-favored-nation,  but J. Michrael  Finger  tailored  to the politics  and
economics  of each  bilateral
relationship.  Its  primary
concern  is  to protect  the
interests  of individuai
domestic  constituents.  What
happens  to foreigners  is
hardly  more  than fallout.
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Summary findings
U.S. trade policy since the 1980s has been quite different  Finger describes the accumulation of these responses.
from trade policy in the first two or three decades after  He tabulates U.S. trade actions in the  1980s, paying
World War  I.  Until the 1970s, U.S. trade policy was  particular  attention to actions against Korea. While
dominated by systemic concerns. Trade policy actions  Korean economic interests were advanced by restrictions
were subject to the discipline of constructing  an open,  on Korea's and other countries'  exports  of steel to the
stable, and nondiscriminatory  system.  United States and the European Union (EU), the
In contrast, for the past 10 or 15 years the main  outcome, judged globally, was probably negative. Rent
objective of trade policy actions has been to respond to  transfers to Korean and other exporters are, on a global
the demands of various domestic constituents for greater  basis, transfers from U.S. and EU users, and hence net to
access to foreign markets, or for reduced foreign access  zero. That leaves only the efficiency effects, which  David
to the U.S. market.  Tarr estimates to add up to a global loss of about $36
When systemic concerns were strong, they helped  million a year, based on prices and the size of the
discipline the actions the U.S. government would take to  industry in 1984.
advance the interest  of a particular constituent.  But now,  The underlying theme, says Finger, is that these actions
these constituent-supporting  actions are U.S. trade  have no unifying discipline except to respond in a
policy.  politically acceptable way to constituent  pressures. These
To state the same point another way, the current  are responses to the politics and economics of specific
objective of U.S. trade  "policy" is to respond to each  situations, not the automatic or hands-off extension  of
constituent's  plea for the application  of this or that  nondiscriminatory  standards that the still-popular
regulatory instrument (antidumping,  "301," and so on)  rhetoric of a "rules-based" system would suggest.
- to respond in a way that will win that constituent's
vote. "Policy" is now no more than a generic label for
the accumulation of these responses.
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US trade policy since the early 1980's is quite different from what that
policy was in the first two or three decades after World War II.  Until the
late 1970's, US trade policy was dominated by systemic concerns.  Trade policy
actions were subject to the discipline of constructing an open, stable and
nondiscriminatory system.  In contrast, for the past ten or fifteen years the
major objective of trade policy actions has been to respond to the demands of
various domestic constituents for greater access to foreign markets, or for
reduced foreign access to the US market.
When systemic concerns were strong, they helped to discipline the
actions the US government would take to advance the interest of a particular
constituent.  But now, these constituent-supporting actions are US trade
policy.  To state the same point another way, the current objective of US
trade "policy" is to respond to each constituent's plea for the application of
this or that regulatory instrument (antidumping, "301," etc.) --  to respond in
a way that will win that constituent's vote.  "Policy," now, is no more thaii  a
generic label for the accumulations of these responses.
This paper describes the accumulation of these responses.  It provides a
tabulation of US trade actions in the 1980's and it pays particular attention
to actions against Korea.  Its underlying theme is that these actions have no
unifying discipline, other than to respond in a politically acceptable way to
constituent pressures.  They are responses to the politics and the economics
of each specific situation, not the automatic or hands-off extension of non-
discriminatory standards the still-popular rhetoric of a "rules-based system"
would suggest.Initatons and CompletIons  of '301' Cases,  by Year
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I.  THE CHANGED THRUST OF  US  TRADE POLICY
The world  trading  system  that  US leadership  helped  to create  at the  end
of World War II --  the GATT system --  had two principal characteristics.  (1)
It  would  be a liberal,  or open system;  though  not a laissez  faire  system.  (2)
Government  intervention  in international  trade  would  be predictable,  i.e.,
only in  previously  stated  circumstances;  and  non-discriminatory.
The system's  objectives  would  be advanced  through  two  related
mechanisms. There  would  be successive  rounds  of multilateral  bargaining  to
reduce  each  member  country's  import  restrictions  and  to bind them  against
unilateral  revision. In this  way  the  openness  of thc  system  would  be created.
This  openness  would  be  preserved,  the  stability  and  the  even-handedness  of the
system  would  be provided,  through  a system  of multilateral  rules  --  GAST  rules
--  that  would  minimize  new  government  interventions  in international  trade  and
would  limit  those  interventions  to  previously  stated  circumstances.  In lir. 
with  this,  some GATT  rules  specify  policies  that  member  countries  may  not  use,
e.g.,  assigning  artificial  customs  values  so as to inflate  tariff  charges.
Other  GATT  rules  specify  circumstances  in which  a national  government  may
restrict  international  trade,  but  the  intent  is always  to limit  intervention
to  the  specified  circumstances.  Article  XII, for  example,  states  that
any contracting  party,  in  order  to  safeguard  its  external
financial  position  and its  balance  of  payments,  may restrict  the
quantity  or value  of merchandise  permitted  to be imported,  subject
to the  provisions  of the  following  paragraphs  of this  Article.
(emphasis  added)
Antidumping,  antic.zbsidy  and  several  other  sorts  of import  restrictions
are similarly  provided  for.
For  the  first  35  or so  years  after  the  GATT was  agreed,  US trade
policy --  and that of many other developed countries --  was approximately what
would  be expected  of a good  GATT  citizen. Trade  policy  was  a part  of foreign
policy,  a viable  and  equitable  international  trading  system  was  a key  part  of-4-
the  post-war  foreign  policy  plan for  world  peace  and  stability. Participation
in the  GATT  rounds  did reduce  trade  restrictions  --  on most  manufactured
goods,  practically  to zero.  Sectoral  pressures  for  new  protection  did  arise,
but on the  whole  the  apparent  subjection  of the  instruments  of protection  to
international  rules  helped  the  government  to parry  many of these  pressures.
The  net result  was the  liberal  and  stable  trading  system  that  GATT's  founders,
including  American  leadership,  had  envisaged.
But, over  the  past  decade  the  orientation  of US trade  policy  has
changed. As Congress  has  reasserted  its  authority  over  trade  policy,  it has
taken  a  less  presidential,  more  congressional,  orientation. While  foreign
policy  has  been the  favored  political  arena  of recent  presidents,  constituent
service  is the  life  blood  of congressional  politics. This trade  policy  has
become  more constituent-oriented,  and  this  shift  has  brought  with it several
important  changes  in the  mechanics  of  US trade  policy. The  most  consequential
change  has  been the  reverual  of the  function  of the "rules'  part  of the  policy
system.
Allow  me to explain  what I  mean  when I  conclude  that  the  function  of the
rules  part has  been  reversed. Consider  first  GATT  rules  such  as those  on
antidumping  and countervailing  duties  --  those  that  allow  import  restrictions
but  attempt  to limit  those  restrictions  to  a few  circumstances.  To a firm  or
industry  losing  sales  to import  competition,  the  crux  of these  rules  is  not
what they  say  about  when a  national  government  cannot  restrict  imports. The
crux  is what  they say  about  when  a national  government  can  restrict  imports.
To an import-competing  interest  these  "trade  remedies"  specify  when that
constituent  has  a right  to call  on his  government  to impose  a trade
restriction  --  and these  rights  have  the  international  sanction  of the  GATT.
As a constituent  views  the  GATT  rules,  so does  the  Congress,  and  import-
competing  interests  understand  the  value  of  being  vocal  constituents.  Over
time,  these  coni'tituents  have  pressed  both to fit  their  needs  to the  trade
remedies'  scope  and to change  the  trade  remedies  scope  to fit  their  needs.-5-
They have been quite successful: so successful that the GATT rules are
now an expression of the domestic politics of trade policy, not a limit on it.
As the policy-making system now works, the sequence of causation is as
follows:
1.  Concerns of domestic enterprises to have protection from
import competition.
2.  Expansion of national administrative practice to accommodate.
3.  Revision of national laws and regulations to validate the
expanded  administrative practice.
4.  Agreement at the multilateral trade negotiations to expand
the relevant international code to provide international
sanction for the expanded national practice.'
The fourth step is little more than gilding --  maintaining the facade of
the old GATT system.  The essence of the new system is that the trada remedies
laws gives any enterprise or industry inhibited by import competition has the
right to call on his government to restrict imports.
The creation of "301"  was a second notable change in the mechanics of US
trade policy.  With "301,,"  US exporters no longer need trade negotiations to
advance their interests.  "301"  uses the threat of tit-for-tat retaliation to
force foreign governments to remove policies that impede US exports, or to
take other actions that favor US exports.  (The  results of "301" cases will be
discussed below.)
The menace of "301" is less that it serves the interests of US exporters
than that it unchains them from the necessity to oppose US import-competing
interests.  Before "301,"  better access to foreign markets for US exporters
was obtained in exchange for giving foreigners similar access o the US
market --  US import restrictions swapped for foreign.  For the president to
negotiate such an exchange he had to be empowered with the authority to reduce
'  This sequence and how the shift came about is explained at greater length in
Finger and Dhar  (1992).-6-
US restrictions.  To pasu  a  law  to  authorize  such  reductions  or to schedule
and then  execute  "fast  track"  implementation,  US exporters  had  to provide  the
government  with  political  support  to  overcome  the  opposition  that import-
competing  firms  would  raise. If the  potential  "winners"  from  a trade
negotiations  package  can  get  what  they  want  with "301,"  there  is  no one to
press  the  Congress  to impose  such  a  package  on the losers. Before  "301,"  a
GATT  round  put the  focus  on "export  politics"  and  away from  "import  politics."
With "301,"  the  US government  can  simultaneously  serve  import-competing  and
exporting  constituents.
in  historical  perspective,  this  shift  to a constituent-oriented  trade
policy  system  is really  a  return  to the  traditional  way  of making  trade  policy
in the  United  States. Once the  federal  income  tax  freed  the  tariff  from  its
revenue  function,  US trade  politics  were soon  dominated  by the "scientific
tariff"  conception  that  tariff  rates  should  be tailored  to  provide  each  US
industry  a margin  of protection  equal  to the  difference  between  foreign  cost
and  domestic. This  was the  economic  philosophy  that  underlay  the  Smoot-Hawley
tariff. In  Smoot-Hawley  days,  calculation  of the  cost  differences  always
showed  that  nature  favored  the foreigner  so that  a positive  tariff  margin  was
needed  to even  things  up.  Today's  calculations  measure,  not  the  unfairness  of
nature  in creating  advantages  for  foreigners,  but the  unfairness  of the
foreigners  themselves. The  following  sections  report  the  results  of some  of
those  calculations.
II.  UNITED  STATES  IMPORT  RESTRICTIONS
After  the  many rounds  of GATT  negotiations,  the  tariff  is no longer  a
major  barrier:  In 1990,  though  only  one-third  of  US imports  entered  duty free,
the  US tariff  averaged  only 3.3  percent,  ad valorem.  (On  imports  from  Korea,
it  was higher,  just  above  6  percent  ad valorem.) Table  1  provides  a summary
statement  of the  extent  of major  non-tariff  barriers  that  restrict  'oreign-7-
access  into  thd  US market  The  reader  should  note that  the  measure  used in
the  table  is not  a measure  of the  height  of non-tariff  barriers,  but  of their
extent  --  the  proportion  of imports  to which  non-tariff  barriers  are  applied.
The table  shows  that  something  less  than  one-fifth  of US imports  are  subject
to  non-tariff  barriers  of the  types  that  have  been tabulated. On imports  from
Korea,  the  figure  is  higher  --  more  than  one-third  of US imports  from  Korea
are  regulated  by a VER,  a similar  restraint  under  the  Multi  Fibre  Arrangement
on textiles  and clothing,  or an antidumping  or countervailing  duty  action.
The  more  extensive  application  of NTBs on imports  from  Korea  is  mainly  a
matter  of the  relative  concentration  of imports  from  Korea  on textiles  and
clothing:  21 percent  of US imports  from  Korea  versus  7 percent  of imports  from
other  countries. About  70  percent  of US imports  of textiles  and  clothing  are
subject  to quantitative  limits,  the  figure  being  about  the  same  for  imports
from  Korea  as from  other  countries.
Particularly  for  established  exporters  like  Korea,  restrictions  on
textiles  exports  are  not  news,  they  have  been around  from the  1960's. The
cutting  edges  of US trade  policy  in the  1960's  were "301"  and  the  extensive
use  of antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  procedures  to restrict  imports.
The  remainder  of this  paper  will focus  on these  mechanisms  and  on the
restrictions  that  have  stemmed  from  their  use.
2  It is  difficult  to develop  a  measure  of "total"  coverage,  i.e.,  by "all"
non-tariff  barriers  because  it is  difficult  to determine,  at the  margin,
whether  certain  regulatiorns  or licensing  requirements  have a trade  restricting
effect. The  categories  in table  1  are  roughly  additive,  but there  are
instances  in  which  a product  under  voluntary  export  restraint  is also  the
object  of an antidumping  or countervailing  duty  order.Table I
United States Imports, 1990: Percentage  on Which the
United States Imposes  Nontariff  Baniers
Voluntary  export  Restrictions  on  Antidumping  and
restraints  jI  textile imports b/  countervailing  duty actions g/
All mrchandise
Imports  from all countrles  7  5  6
Imports  from Korea  9  15  5
Manufactured  goods
Import from all countries  6  7  9
Imports  from Korea  7  16  5
Source: World Bank staff estimates based  on the UNCTAD  Trade Control Measures  System  and the
harmonized  system  for commodity  classificaton system.
Notes:  a.  Includes  voluntary price minimums  and voluntary  quantity maximums.
b.  Includes  those under the Multi Fibre  Arrangement  and those not under MFA.
c.  Includes  antidumping  and countervailing  duty orders  in place, agreed undertakings  in place and
cs-ses  initiated  in calendar  year 1990.- 9 -
III. SECTION "301"
Section 301  (of  the trade act of 1974) is an important part of the US
Congress's response to US exporters' complaints about foreign practices and
policies that reduce these exporters' access to foreign markets.  As a weapon
against foreign practices, the section ultimately authorizes the US Trade
Representative 3 to selectively reduce foreign access to the US market.  The
section, as amended in 1979, 1984 and 1988, explicitly covers not only
merchandise trade, but services, investment and intellectual property as well.
Cross-retaliation is allowed, e.g., the Trade Representative may retaliate by
restricting imports of merchandise  from a country in which US investment  or
sales of services  has been compromised.
"301" deals with three categories of practices that burden or restrict
US commerce --  unjustifiable, unreasonable and discriminatory.
"Unjustifiable" is defined as any act, policy or practice that violates the
international legal rights of the United States --  including (but  not limited
to) those under a trade agreement such as the GATT, a bilateral Voluntary
Export Restraint Agreement, or an agreement that settled a previous "301"
case.  When the agreement in question has its own dispute settlement process
(as  the GATT does) the Trade Representative is required to submit the matter
to that dispute settlement process simultaneous with his investigation under
"301."  However, the schedule and the terms of the "301" investigation are
dominant.
If the US Trade Representative finds a foreign violation that is
"unjustifiable," she must retaliate. 4 But, the section also allows the
President to waive retaliation if the GATT dispute settlement process decides
against the United States, the foreign government takes action to remove or
3  The section has been modified and extended in the trade acts of 1979, 1984
and 1988.  Until the 198P amenuments, "301"  authority rested with the
President.
4  Since 1988, retaliation may not be on the case's subject product or service,
e.g., if the subject practice affects US exports of rice, retaliation cannot
be a restriction on US imports of rice.- 10  -
offset the violation, or if retaliation would backfire and significantly harm
US commercial interests or US national security.
Section 301 defines "unreasonable"  as an act, policy or practice that
is unfair and inequitable, though not necessarily a violation of explicit US
legal rights.  Specific actions are listed as unreasonable: the list including
denial of workers' rights, export targeting, denial of fair and equitable
market opportunities, and government toleration of systematic anticompetitive
activities. 5 "Discriminatory "  means any act, policy or practice that denies
national or most favored nation treatment to US goods, services or investment.
Retaliatory action in these cases is discretionary.
Besides tightening "regular" 201, the 1988 trade act added two major
provisions,"  "Super 301" and "Special 301."  Super 301 mandated that the Trade
Representative, in May 1989 and April 1990, submit to Congress a list of
"!?riority  countries" and "priority  practices" that pose significant barriers
to US exports.  The act also requires the Trade Representative to initiate
investigations concerning each priority practice of each priority country.
Special 301 provides similar requirements to identify and investigate
"priority countries" that maintain barriers against US exports of
telecommunication products and services.
The following sections discuss the case history of "Regular 301," and
after that, the impact of Super 301 and Special 301.
Industry-country  incidence  of  cases
Since "301"  was created in the 1974 trade bill, the USTR has opened a
total of 86 investigations, 72 of which had been completed'  --  this count as
of August 15, 1991.  Of the 12 "pending" cases, six were suspended when the
5  The 1988 act introduced a provision to permit foreign governments to defend
themselves against accusations of "unreasonableness" by pointing out that the
United States does the same thing. (Hudec,  1990, p. 22)
9  USTR  (1991b)  reports 28 petitions that did not lead to investigations.- 11 -
target  country  agreed  to take  up the  matter  Jn a multilateral  negotiation. 7
Each  of the  other  mix  is  a recently  initiated  investigation  that  has  not come
to its  mandatory  completion  date.
Foreign  liberalization  has  been the  most frequent  outcome. "301"  can
be criticized  over  many  dimensions,  but  my tabulation  of investigations  and
outcomes  indicates  that  its  primary  function  has  not  been to  provide  the  US
government  with  an excuse  to restrict  imports. Table  2 reports  that  the  most
frequent  outcome  of a case is for  the  target  country  to liberalize  the  policy
that  the "301"  case  attacked.
To understand  what the  numbers  in the  table  might  mean,  the  reader
should  be aware  of several  facets  of "301"  outcomes. For  one,  before  a net
liberaLlization  was reached,  several  cases  went through  intermediate  stages  of
retaliation  by the  United  States,  and counter-retaliation  by the  target
country. For  example,  the  National  Pasta  Association  filed  a  petition  on
October  16,  1981,  alleging  EC violation  of GATT  Article  XVI and  the  GATT
Subsidies  Code  in using  pasta  export  subsidies  that  resulted  in increased
imports  into  the  United  States. USTR initiated  an investigation  and consulted
several  times  with the  EC.  USTR  also  refereed  the  matter  to  the  GATT
Subsidies  Code for  conciliation.  In 1982,  a dispute  settlement  panel  was
established:  consideration  of its  findings  extended  into  1985.  In  1985,  the
United  States  increased  its  customs  duties  on pasta imports  --  technically,  in
retaliation  for the  EC's  discriminatory  citrus  tariffs. The  EC counter-
retaliated  on lemons  and  walnuts.
In  August  1986  the  US and  the  EC agreed  to end  their  retaliatory  and
counter-retaliatory  duties  and to  negotiate  in  good faith  toward  a settlement
to the  pasta  dispute. In  August  1987  the  US and the  EC reached  tentative
agreement  by which  the  EC would  eliminate  export  subsidies  on half the  pasta
'  All six  are  on topics  being  negotiated  at the  Uruguay  Round. Three  concern
disputes  over  European  Community  agricultural  subsidies,  that  date  back  as
"301"  cases  to 1981. A fourth,  concerning  Argentine  marine  insurance,  began
in 1979.- 12  -
Table 2
United States  "301" Cases  Completed  through August 15, 1991
by Outcome  and Country Group
Other
Target  country,  Total  Negative  Tarre Country  Liberalization  US  Reatrichtv
by  group  Dtei.rmination  Multilkeral  Bilateral  Total  Retaliation  OUjCOmeaSJ
AN  Countrsa
fNurnber  of cas.s  74  11  35  12  47  10  5
(% of total number)  (100)  (15)  (47)  (16)  (64)  (14)  (7)
Develoed Countriest
Number  of cases  47  7  17  9  26  8  5
(% of total number)  (100)  (15)  (36)  (19)  (55)  (17)  (11)
Developing  Countries
Number  of cases  26  3  18  3  21  2  2
(% of total number)  (100)  (12)  (69)  (12)  (81)  (8)  (8)
Developing  exd.  Korea
Number  of cases  18  3  13  1  14  1  0
(% of total number)  (100)  (17)  (72)  (6)  (78)  (6)  (0)
Korea
Number  of cases  8  0  5  2  7  1  0
(% of total number  (100)  (0)  (63)  (25)  (88)  (13)  (0)
Source:  Tabulated  from Office of the US Trade Representative,  "Section  301 Table of Cases,' Washington,  DC, USTR,
August 15, 1991, photocopied.
a/l  In three of these, on the US govemment's  recommendation  the petitioner withdrew  his "301" petition  and
petitioned  instead  for an import-restrcting  action - an antidumping  or a safeguards  action. One of the others
was the Canadian softwood  lumber case, in which Canada imposed  an export tax.  The fifth was the Japanese
semiconductor  case in which Japan agreed to import more US semiconductors  and to observe a minimum
price on Japanese  sales in third markets.
b/  In 1979 a US firm complained  about the Swiss customs  service's testing of the gold content of eyegass
frames. USTR's investigation  revealed  that US standards  for testing and making  gold content were different
from those used by many other countries. The US industry  agreed to shift to the more common  standards  and
markings  which the Swiss customs  service would accept  without further testing. This action is claified  as
"liberaliation by the US," and does not fit into any of the categories  listed in this table.- 13 -
exported  to the  United  States. The  US Customs  Service  is now  monitoring  that
agreement.
The  pasta  case  also illustrates  that it  is difficult  to say  what is the
"final"  outcome  of a case.  In this  example,  the  petitioner  (the  National  Pasta
Association)  might,  in the  future,  come to suspect  that  the  EC has  not  reduced  its
subsidy  as agreed. If so,  he might file  another  "301"  petition,  and he will  have
the  additional  grounds  that the  EC is in violation  of the  agreement  reached  to end
the  previous  pasta  investigation.
Most of the  induced  liberalixations  have  boen  multilateral  rather  th  A
preferential  to the  United  States. Table  2 sorts  foreign  liberalizations  into  two
categories,  multilateral  or bilateral. The  pasta  case  ended  with an action  by the
EC that  would  benefit  only  US producers. Another  case  that  ended  with  a bilateral
liberalization  began  with  a  petition  in 1976  the  United  Egg Producers  complaining
of a Canadian  import  quota  on US eggs.  Eventually,  Canada  agreed  to double  the  US
quota.  In  a more recent  case that  ended  with  a bilateral  concession,  the  Amtech
Corporation  (a  US company)  complained  that  Norway  denied  US rights  under  the  GATT
government  procurement  code,  and in  so doing  adversely  affected  US (i.e.,
Amtech's)  sales  of highway  toll  electronic  identification  equipment. In  the  end
the  Norwegian  government  agreed  to several  actions  to offset  the impact  of their
procurement  practices  on the  petitioner. One  of these  was  to clarify  that  the
Amtech  system  met  the  requirements  of the  Oslo Toll  Ring  project,  another  was  to
provide  a statement  that  the  Amtech  system  has  been found  to  be proven,  reliable,
competitive,  and  type-approved  by the  Norwegian  PTT.
While  a number  of countries  found  responses  that  benefitted  only the  United
States,  Table  2 shows  that  almost  three  times  as often  the  liberalization  was  a
multilateral  action  --  something  that  would  benefit  all  exporters,  not just  the
United  States. In 1979,  in response  to  an investigation  stemming  from  a petition
by the  National  Canners  Association,  the  EC agreed  to discontinue  a minimum  import
price  system  that  had  been  applied  to imports  of canned  fruits,  canned  juices  and
canned  vegetables. In  another  multilateral  action  pressed  for  by a '301"  case,
Taiwan  in 1986  abolished  a schedule  for  assigning  customs  duties  that  departed-14  -
from  the  principle  of basing  such  duties  on invoice  values. And a "301"  case
filed  by the  Florida  Citrus  Mutual  was  part of  the  build-up  to agreement  by Japan
to eliminate  quotas  on imports  of fresh  oranges  and  orange  juice. An intermediate
stage,  involving  enlargement  of import  quotas,  was  skewed  perhaps  toward  the
United  States.
Of course,  the  pressure  of "301"  was  not  the  only impetus  for  many of the
policy  actions  that  terminated  the  cases  --  and  may  even in  some cases  have  slowed
the  target  country's  implementation  of  a reform  it had  already  decided  --  but
qualifications  aside,  the  pattern  of these  policy  actions  should  be noted.
Counting  the  one  case that  ended  with a liberalizing  action  by the  United (see  the
footnote  to Table  2), two-thirds  of completed  cases  ended  with  a liberalizing
action. Eleven  petitions  were  dismissed  as not justifying  any  action,  leaving
three  times  as  many liberalizing  outcomes  as restrictive  outcomes.
Many of the  dimputes  were  with  the  MC over  agriculture. Tables  3 and  4
provide  information  on the  distributions  of "301"  cases  across  countries  and
across  subject  matter. By far  the  biggest  lump  of cases (29  of the  86)  were about
EC agricultural  policies. Subsidies  were  the  subject  of  many  of them,  though
there  were  other  issues,  such  as the  displacement  of  US exports  when Spain  and
Portugal  joined  the  EC.
"Traditional  issues  were  disputed  with  developed  countries,  "new  issue."
with  developing  countries. Almost  half  of the cases  that  targeted  a developing
country  were on subjects  that  the  Uruguay  Round  labels  "new  issues"  --  services,
intellectual  property,  and  investment  regulations  that  affect  trade.  In contrast,
disputes  with  developed  countries  were  almost  all  over "traditional  issues"  --
restrictions  that  limited  access  of US merchandise  exports  to foreign  markets.
(Table  2)
The country  incidenc,  of "301"  cases  and  of cases  against  "unfair  exports"
to the  US were about  the same. Table  4 compares  the  distribution  of "301"  cases
with the distribution of antidumping plus countervailing duty cases in the United
States. Across  broad  country  groups  (developed,  developing,  etc.),  they  are  much
the  same.  Using  the  share  of  US imports  they  supply  as the  norm,  the EC and- 15  -
Table 3
Subjects  of US "301" Cases, July 1975  - July 1991
(number  of cases)
Merchandiae  Trade  Services  Intellectual  Government  /Ivestment  Several  Total
Agriculture  Manufactures  Trade  Propry  Procedurec5  Regulations  Subject
All Countries
Number  of cats  40  24  11  7  2  1  1  86
(% of total number)  (47)  (28)  (13)  (8)  (2)  (1)  (1)  (100)
Devebped Countrbs
Number  of cases  30  19  3  0  0  0  0  52
(% of total number)  (58)  (37)  (6)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (100)
Developing  Countries
Number  of cases  10  5  7  7  2  1  1  33
(% of total number)  (30)  (15)  (21)  (21)  (6)  (3)  (3)  (100)
Developing  excd.  Korea
Number  of cases  7  5  5  6  2  1  1  25
(% of total number)  (28)  (20)  (20)  (24)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (100)
Korea
Number  of cases  3  2  2  1  0  0  0  8
(% of total number)  (38)  (25)  (25)  (13)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (100)
Source:  Tabulated  from Office of the US Trade Representative,  "Section 301 Table of Cases,"  Washington,  DC, USTR,
August 15, 1991, photocopied.
a/  Customs  valuation  and import licensing  procedures.-16  -
Table 4
Countries  That Are the Object of US Antidumping  and
Countervailing  Cases  and of "301" Cases; Comparison
(antidumping  and countervailing  duty cases, 1980-1988;
"301" cases, July 1975  - July 1991)
Cownry or group of countres  Cases against this county or group as a X  Percentage  of 1989 US merchandie imports
of total  against  all countries  that  originate  in this country  or group
AntiduaipLg  and coutrvailing  "301"  cas
dut  cams
AN  Counties  100  100  100
Deveped  Countries  58  61  63
Develpng  Countries  37  38  36
Eastem European  Countries  5  1  0.5
European  Community  40  34  18
Brazil  7  6  1.8
South Africa  2.6  0  0.3
Korea  4.7  9  4.2
Mexico  4.5  0  5.7
Taiwan, China  3.7  6  5.1
Hong Kong  0.1  0  2.1
Singapore  0.  0  1.9
Canada  5  8  19
Japan  6  14  20
Argentina  1.4  a  0.3
aoure Tabulated  from Office of the US Trade Representative,  "Secton 301 Table of Cases,"  Washington,  DC, USTR,
August 15, 1991, photocopied.- 17 -
Brazil  are  relatively  hard  hit  by "301"  cases,  Japan  and Canada  relatively
lightly  hit.  The same  is true  for  the  incidence  of antidumping  plus
countervailing  duty  cases. But  while  Korea  suffers  just  about  "its  share"  of
antidumping  plus countervailing  duty cases,  it  has  been the  object  of a
relatively  large  number  of "301"  cases. The  targets  and the  outcomes  of these
cases  will  be discussed  below.
Came*  against  Korea
Cases  against  Korea  have covered  the  spectrum  of "301's"  scope:
merchandise,  intellectual  property  and  services. (The  eight  cases  against
Korea  are  summarized  in the  Appendix.) One  case  ended  with  Korea  implementing
a  significant  updating  of its  intellectual  property  laws,  four  ended  with
Korea  making  significant  non-dlscriminatory  reductions  of barriers  on imports
of footwear,  cigarettes,  beef  and  wine --  ordinary  products  exported  by many
countries. The insurance  cases  --  there  were,  in sequence,  two  cases,  leading
to one  outcome  --  led  to the  government  of Korea  to admit  US firms  into
several  parts  of the  Korean  market. This outcome  was thus  coded
"liberalization-bilateral"  --  the  best it  does for  third  country  vendors  is to
spur them  to negotiate  for  treatment  similar  to that  extended  to US firms.
The  eighth  case  on the  list  concerned  a complaint  about  production  subsidies
and  import  restrictions  on wire  rope  and  cable. But  the  US steel  industry  was
at that  time  filing  many  unfair  trade  petitions  in an  attempt  to force  the  US
government  to negotiate  comprehensive  import  limits  on steel. The industry
succeeded  in this  objective,  and though  the  petitioner  eventually  withdrew  the
petition  before  the "301"  process  reached  a decision,  I  have classified  the
outcome  as "retaliation"  by the  United  States. It is  an example  of what  many
feared  "301"  would  be --  a  means  by  which  the  United  States  would  justify  more
trade  restrictions  of its  own.  But, as the  previous  section  has shown,  there
have  been few  such  outcomes. The  profile  of outcomes  in cases  against  Korea -
- six  liberalizations,  only  two  bilateral,  versus  one restriction  imposed  by
the  United  States  --  is close  to the  profile  of the  entire  sample  of cases.- 18  -
IV.  ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
The other side of contemporary US trade policy is the use of antidumping
and countervailing duty cases to regulate US imports.  As "301" is designed to
provided a service for particular constituents who want better access to
foreign markets, antidumping and countervailing duty regulations have been
tailored over the past two decades to provide a service for particular US
constituents who are hurt by import competition.  For these interests, unfair
trade cases are where the action is.  According to two of Washington's top
trade lawyers (Horlick  and Oliver, 1988, p.5) they "have become the usual
first choice for industries seeking protection from imports into the United
States."  There have been a lot of cases.  From 1975 to 1979, the US
government processed 245 antidumping and countervailing duty cases, a pace of
some 50 cases a year.  In the 1980's, the case load rose even higher, to 774
cases between 1980 and 1988, or 86 cases a year.  By comparison, there have
been only four escape clause cases a year, cases in which an industry sought
protection from import competition without accusing the foreign seller of
employing or benefiting from unfair practices.'
Pattern  of  cases  and  outcomes
The ccuntry incidence of antidumping and countervailing duty cases is
tabulated in Annex Table 1, summarized in Table 5.  In another paper, Tracy
Murray and I have described at some length the pattern of these cases: here I
will limit myself to noting several features that stand out in that pattern.
0  For developed and for developing countries, the proportion of cases is
about the same as the proportion of US imports that originate in each group.
There are large differences within groups, however.  Japan and the EC each
supply about 20 percent of US imports, but the EC has been the object of 40
'  The United States is not alone in this.  Many country review their imports
for instances of unfairness.  Since 1980, the three other major users of GATT-
based import screens, Australia, Canada and the European Community, have
processed over a thousand antidumping and countervailing duty cases, but only
seventeen safeguard cases.- 19  -
percent of US antidumping and countervailing duty cases, Japan of only 6
percent.  Among developing countries, imports from Brazil generate a
disproportionately high number of cases, and imports from Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore disproportionately low numbers.  Table 4 shows that Korea's
experience is representative of the central tendency: Korea supplies 4.2
percent of US imports and was hit by 4.7 percent of US cases.
Table 5
Countervailing  Duty and Antidumping  Outcomes  Compared,  1980-89
Antdwm  nga  Re6nct"R  OLiatm. a  a  Nopiod  expat  rsaumt  a
a  dwva  wcettm  Of  t0  cm  dSi  of  MSfltN  Oi
Coanb  or  wow  of  tota  runbU  Antdumprs  Countevailg  rot  A&N4umpwg  Counteraui  Both
All countries  50  72  67  70  63  66  64
Developed  countries  49  69  61  65  65  82  74
Developing  countries  46  73  77  75  55  46  49
Korea  54  77  100  86  82  86  84
Eastem European  countries  87  91  60  87  77  100  78
Source:  Finger  and Murray 1990
*  Almost half the cases (348  of 774) have been superseded by negotiated
export restraints.  Thus virtually all of the import restrictions the United
States has put in place are GATT-legal or better --  "or better" in the sense
that the exporter preferred the negotiated restraint to the by-the-books
action that was just around the administrative corner.  Negotiated restraints
have superseded nearly three-fourths of cases against Korea.
*  Cases against developing  countries more often come to restrictive
outcomes than cases against developed countries --  three-fourths versus two-
thirds.  Against Korea, 31 of 36 cases (84  percent) ended with a restrictive- 20 -
outcome.  ("Restrictive"  outcomes  include  cases  that  reached  an affirmative
final  determination  or that  were  superseded  by a restrictive  agreement  with
the  exporter.) But  negotiated  export  restraints  were  more often  used  against
developed  countries  --  74  percent  of cases  compared  with 49  percent  for
developing  countries. A country  that  possesses  the  countervailing  power  to
retaliate  is  accorded  the  courtesy  of  a negotiated  settlement. Others  are
restricted  in the  normal  course  os administrative  procedures. Korea,  in this
regard,  is treated  as one  of the  powers  --  84  percent  of restrictive  outcomes
against  Korea  were  VERs.
*  The  US government  almost  always  finds  that  the foreign  exporter  is
unfair  or is benefiting  from  the  unfair  actions  of its  government. Only 11
percent  of dumping  and  subsidy  determinations  resulted  in negative
decisions.'
e  When  no action  is taken  against  the  foreign  exporter,  more than  six
times  in seven  it is because  no competing  US  producer  has  been hurt.
Taking  into  account  both  the  sequencing  of the  dumping  and injury  tests
and the  patterns  of outcomes  of  each in  the 1980's,  a "typical"  100
antidumping  or countervailing  cases  would  end  up with the  following  outcomes:
'  No country-by-country  tally  is  available  for  this summary  statement,  nor for
the  following  one.|  Q~~~~~utcome  Nu,mber
Negotiated export restraint  45
Antidumping or countexvailing duty order  23
Case formally dismissed, because of
Negative injury determination  27




From 1980 through 1988, the US government processed twenty-two
antidumping and fourteen countervailing duty cases against Korea.  The largest
part of these --  twenty two, in total --  involved Korean exports of steel and
steel products.  These were part of an avalanche of cases the US steel
industry filed to force the US  government to negotiate quantitativ.re  limits on
all imports into the United States.  Consumer electronics, particularly color
television sets, are another part of Korean exports that have come under
antidumping attack. 10 Korea has not however negotiated a quantitative
restraint on television sets: they remain under antidumping order.  Comparing
the way Korean producers have adjusted in the steel case, where quantitative
limits have been put in  place, with the way producers of television sets have
adjusted provides an important insight into contemporary trade policy.  The
two outcomes are compared below.
10  Bark (1991)  reports that color television sets and other Korean consumer
electronics have also been hit by antidumping actions in Australia, Canada,
and the European Community.- 22 -
Qaotas  on steel.  For  thirty  years  after  World  War II,  world  consumption
of steel  grew by 5  percent  to 6  percent  a  year.  But the  oil crisis  of ldte
1974  and.  the  following  world  recession  brought  dramatic  challenges  to the
steel  industry  --  consumption  in 1975  was 10  percent  less  than  in 1974  and
growth  of demand  disappeared. It  would  tale  10  years,  until  1984,  for  world
demand  to make  up the  10  percent  drop  recorded  on 1975,  and  growth  after  that
would  be much slower  than  before  1975. Besides  the  change  of demand  and  the
resulting  overcapacity  of the  world  industry,  significant  changes  of
competitive  structure  had also  occurred. These  changes  allowed  Japan  and
eventually  Korea  to enjoy  a cost  advantage  in  producing  standardized  products
over traditional  producers  in  Europe  and  North  America. In response  to this
challenge,  both  the  United  States  and the  European  Community  established
comprehensive  systems  of quantitative  restrictions  on imports.
David  Tarr  has  published  an analysis  of the  effects  of these  US and  EC
restrictions  on exporting  countries,  particularly  Korea. He found,  first  of
all, that though  the  cutback  of export  sales  caused  the  price  of steel  to fall
in Korea,  the  comprehensive  systems  of controls  in  place  in the  US and in the
EC actually  allowed  Korean  export  prices  to rise.  Korea's  output  of steel  was
reduced,  and  because  Korea  has comparative  advantage  in  world  trade  in steel,
this  meant  that there  were  efficiency  losses  to the  world  economy  and
specifically  to Korea. But  Tarr  estimates  that  the "rent"  Korean  exporters
collected  by way  of the  higher-than-competitive  prices  in the  US and EC
markets  are several  times  larger  than  the  efficiency  losses,  leaving  the
Korean  economy  more  than  32 million  dollars  a year  better  off  than it  would  be
if US and EC steel  imports  were  not  controlled.
Antidumping  orders  against  color  television  sets."  The  Korean
electronics  industry  began  as a  modern  industry  in 1958,  when it first
produced  radios  on an assembly  line.  By 1988,  total  production  was $24
billion. Of this  output,  $15  billion,  almost  two-thirds,  was  exported.
1 This subsection  draws  from  Bark (1991).- 23  -
The Korean industry includes  more that 150 small firms but is dominated
by three large ones: Gold Star, Samsung  and Daewoo.  Through the 1980's the
big three accounted for virtually 100 percent of Korean production of all
major consumer electronics products, including color television sets.
While Korean production of color television sets is concentrated, the
international market is very competitive.  Yoon-Wook Jun  (1988)  lists twenty
producers that sell color TVs in the US market under the manufacturers's
names.  In addition, a number of major retailers like Sears, K-Mart and J.C.
Penny sell color TVs under their own brand names.  The intensity of
competition is illustrated by changes in relative prices.  Over the twenty
years from 1967 to 1986, the US consumer price index more than tripled.  But
prices of TVs and tape recorders actually fell, in nominal terms,  while prices
of  radios and sound equipment went up by less than 10 percent.
The Korean government has supported development of the industry in
several ways, including tax breaks and loans at below market rates of
interest.  But the major form of government support of consumer electronics
producers has been through import restrictions --  during the formative years
of the Korean companies, imports of competing products were banned --  and the
consequent opportunity to charge monopoly prices at home.  In 1958, when other
controls were still in effect, the tariff rate on consumer electronics was 40
percent.  That import protection allowed Korean companies to collect  a 40
percent premium on their domestic sales over the competitive price they had to
charge in export markets where they had no monopoly power.  That premium
collected on the one-third of output sold domestically, amounted to a 20
percent bonus on the two-thirds of production that was exported.1 2
During the 1980's, Korea supplied less than 2 percent of world exports
but was the respondent in 6 percent of the world's antidumping cases.  (These
12  There have been no countervailing duty cases against Korean consumer
electronics, however evidence from countervailing duty cases against other
Korean products that have benefitted from programs similar to those available
to consumer electronics producers indicates that the value of direct bonuses
plus tax benefits and other programs that might be construed as subsidies
ranged from 1 to 3 percent.- 24 -
figures  relate  to antidumping  cases  in  and  exports  to all  countries.  Annex
table  I  shows  that  the  ratios  of exports  to and  AD plus CVD  cases  in the
United  States  were roughly  proportional.)  What is the rational  response  to
antidumping  actions  by companies  in the  position  of the  Korean  consumer
electronics  producers? They  have  considerable  control  over  their  prices  in
Korea  and thus  could  make  adjustments  there. But in export  markets,  they  are
entirely at the  mercy  of market  forces. To raise  export  prices  by the  amount
necessary  to avoid  antidumping  duties  would  be to price  themselves  out of
these  markets. Thus reducing  prices  in  Korea  --  which  provides,  after  all,
only  one-third  of their  sales  --  would  seem  the  better  business  alternative.
Political  reactions  in  Korea  also  made the  lowering  of internal  prices
the  better  political  option. The  antidumping  cases  emphasized  to Korean
consumers  and  politicians  that  Koreans  were  being  asked  to pay  considerably
higher  prices  than foreigners  for  Korean  products. This pricing  soon  became  a
hot  political  issue,  leading  eventually  to congressional  hearings  at which
industry  officials  were  pressed  to explain  their  high  domestic  prices.
The  evidence  supports  the  contention  that  the  major  adjustment  Korean
producers  would  make  would  be to  the  prices  they charged  in Korea. Take  color
TVs.  Bark (1991)  shows  that  before  the  US antidumping  cases,  export  prices
(approximated  by unit  values)  had  been  declining  sharply,  by 15  percent  from
1980 to 1983.  The antidumping order did not change this downward trend,:
export prices fell another 5 percent form 1983 to 1984 and 10 percent more by
1988.  As for prices in Korea, before the US antidumping case their trend was
level --  the same in 1983 as they had been in 1980.  But when the Korean
companies  began  to adjust  to reduce  the  bite  of the  antidumping  orders,  Korean
prices  began  to fall.  By 1985,  they  were 20  percent  below  the  1983  level  and
by 1988,  30 percent  below.- 25 -
V. CONCLUSIONS
David  Tarr's  study  shows  that  restrictions  on Korea's  exports  of steel
h&d  a positive  impact  on Korean  economic  welfare. We have  no similar
calculation  for  the  impact  of antidumping  actions  against  Korean  exports  of
TVs,  but Bark's  evidence  does  show  that  Korean  consumers  benefitted  from
considerably  lower  prices,  while  importing  country  consumers  seemed  not to
have  been burdened  by higher  prices. The  main  effect,  it seems,  is thac the
antidumping  orders  provided  a disincentive  for  Korean  producers  to exploit  the
monopoly  power  they  hold  over  the  Korean  market. Judged  on a global  basis,
the  effects  of antidumping  actions  against  Korean  exports  of color  TVs  seems
to have  been  welfare-enhancing.
While  the  Korean  economic  interests  were  advanced  by restrictions  on
Korea's  and  other  countries'  exports  of steel  to the  US and  the  EC, the
outcome,  judged  on a  global  basis,  was  probably  negative. Rent  transfers  to
Ko:e,ai  and  other  exporters  are,  on a  global  basis,  transfers  from  US and  EC
users,  and  hence  net to zero. That leaves  only the  efficiency  effects,  which
Tarr estimates  to sum  to  a global  loss  of about  $36  million  a  year --  based  on
prices  and  the  size  of the  industry  in 1984.
The  major  differences  between  the  two  cases  are (1)  the  restrictions  on
steel  imports  were  against  all  producers,  not  just  Korea,  and (2)  importing
countries  did  not offer  a price  supporting  quantitative  restraint  as an
alternative  to their  antidumping  orders.
As to "301,"  I  have focused  on its  results  rather  than  on its  process.
Anyone  who  wishes  to  may reject  "301"  as an  unacceptable  process  --  and I  do
not  quarrel  that  it is  gunboat  diplomacy  --  but  he or she  should  be aware  of
the  results  that  would  thus  be given  up.  Though  I  have  not argue  the  point
here,  access  to the  US market  has  been  one  the  major  avenues  to development  in
the  post W II  era.  Except  for  the  matter  of multilateral  consent  --  and
again,  I do  not question  that this  matter  is  an important  one --  "301"  uses
access  to this  asset  in  the  way  World  Bank  or International  Monetary  Fund- 26  -
policy-based  lending  uses  access  to the  capital  these  institutions  can
provide.
As to the changed  nature  of US trade  policy,  my contention  at the
beginning  of the  essay  was  that it is  now  particularized  policy  --  the
importance  of trade  remedies  and "301"  in  U.S.  policy  means  that it is  no
longer  MFN,  but  tailored  to the  politics  and the  economics  of each  bilateral
relationship. Indeed,  it  is possible  to say that  US trade  policy  is domestic
policy  first  and  trade  policy  only  secondarily. Its  primary  concern  is  to
take  care of the  interests  of individual  domestic  constituents,  what happens
to foreigners  is,  within  the  bounds  of what  determines  what  policy  will be,
hardly  more than  fallout.
Of course,  the "data"  I  have  presented  are "reduced  form"  data  and the
hypothesis  I  advanced  is  about  the  structure  of the  system  that  generates  US
trade  policy  actions. Thus  some  readers  may  not  be convinced  by my argument.
In  that case,  I  must fall  back on the  hope  that these  data --  as they  describe
the pattern of recent US policy actions --  are of interest of themselves --
perhaps  more so than  my hypothesis.- 27 -
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Appendix I
A LIST OF UNITED STATES "I301"t  CASES AGAINST KOREA
(301-20)
Complaint
The American Home Assurance Company on Nov. 5, 1979, alleged that Korea was
discriminating against the petitioner by failing to issue write insurance
policies covering marine risks; not permitting the petitioner to participate
in joint venture fire insurance, and failing to grant retrocession from the
Korea Reinsurance Corp. to the petitioner on the same basis at to Korean
insurance firms.
Disposition
USTR initiated an investigation on July 2, 1979; invited public comments on
the petition and on proposals for retaliation.  USTR held several rounds of
consultations with the Government of Korea, resulting in a commitment from the
Government of Korea to promote more open competition in the insurance market.




On Sept. 16, 1985, at the President's direction, USTR initiated an
investigation into Korean practices that restrict the ability of US insurers
to provide insurance services in the Korean market.  This was one of the
cases initiated by the President in response to pressure from Congress over
the lack of success achieved in this matter and in other matters involving
several countries.- 30 -
Disposition
There  were intense  consultations  with  Korea  from  Nov. 1985 through  July
1986.  In  July 1986  the  United  States  and  Korea  announced  an agreement  whereby
the  Government  of Korea  agreed  to:
10 license  two  US firms  to  underwrite  compulsory  fire  insurance,  effective
July 31,  1986;  2) admit  two  US firms  to the  compulsory  fire  insurance  pool
effective  the  same  date;  license  at one  US firm  to  underwrite  life insurance
by the  end  of 1986;  3) license  additional  qualified  US firms  to  underwrite
both life  and  nonlife  insurance  (no  specified  deadline];  5) reach  specific
understandings  on certain  technical  and  administrative  matters  including
reinsurance  by the  end  of 1986.- 31  -




Oct,  25,  1982,  The Footwear  Industries  of America,  Inc.  et.al.  filed  a
petition  alleging  that  import  restrictions  on  non-rubber  footwear  by Korea,
the  EC and  7 other  countries  divert  exports  to the  US and deny  US access,  are
inconsistent  with the  GATT,  are  unreasonable  and/or  discriminatory  and  a
burden  on US commerce.
Disposition
On Dec.  8, 1982,  USTR  opened  investigations  of the  alleged  restrictive
practices  --  other  than  allegations  that  GATT-bound  tariffs  are  excessive  and
about  trade  diversion  --  made against  Korea,  Brazil,  Japan  and  Taiwan.  The  US
and  Korea  consulted  in Feb.  and  in  Aug. 1983.  USTR  reported  to the  Senate  on
April  18, 1985,  that  Korea  reduced  tariffs  on footwear  item  and  removed  all
leather  items  form  the  import  surveillance  list.
(301-39)
Complaint
An association  of US wire  rope  and  specialty  cable  manufacturers  filed  a
petition  on March 16,  1983,  alleging  that  production  of Korean  steel  wire rope
is subsidized,  that  Korean  limits  on imports  from  Japan  diverts  Japanese
exports  to the  US,  and  that  Korean  producers  infringe  on  US trademarks.
Disposition
USTR initiated  an investigation  on May 2, 1983,  with  respect  to claims  of
production  subsidies,  held  a  domestic  hearing  and  requested  consultations
under  the subsidies  code.  The  petition  was withdrawn  in  Nov. 1983.  In 1994
the  US government  put  in  place  a comprehensive  system  of (negotiated)  quotas
on steel  imports.- 32 -




At the President's direction, on  Nov. 4, 1985, USTR, initiated an
invest:.gation  of Korea's lack of protection of US intellectual property
rights.
Disposition
The US consulted with Korea from November 1985 through July 1986.  On
July 21, 1986, the White House announced agreement with Korea.
On Copyrights, the Government of Korea agreed 1) to present to the
National Assembly for enactment by mid-1987, comprehensive copyright bills
including coverage of traditional literary works, sound recordings and
computer software; 2) to accede during 1987 to the Universal Copyright
Convention and the Geneva Phonographs  Convention.
On patents, the Government of Korea agreed 1) to submit for enactment by
mid-1987 a comprehensive bill to amend Korean patent law to include patent
protection for chemicals and pharmaceutical products and new uses thereof,
provide patent protection for new microorganisms; 2) accede to the Budapest
treaty in 1987.
On trademarks, Korea eliminated 1) its requirement for technology
inducement (trademarks already subject to technology inducement agreements
will continue beyond the life of that agreement);  2) its requirement that
trademarks be licensed only for a joint ventures or if there were an
accompanying materials supply agreement; 3) export requirements on goods
covered by trademark licenses; 4) restrictions on royalty terms in licenses.
Several other matters related to trademarks were also agreed.
The Government of Korea also agreed to give high priority to enforcement
and to enact effective penalties for intellectual property rights violations.
The agreement is beinq monitored on the TTS  mide  by an interagency tark
force.- 33  -




On Jan.  22,  1988,  the  US Cigarette  Export  Association  filed  a petition
complaining  that  the  policies  and  practices  of the  Korean  Government  Monopoly
Corporation  unreasonably  denied  access  to the  Korean  cigarette  market.
Dispouition
After  consultations,  the  Government  of Korea  agreed  to open the  Korean
market  for  cigarettes  on July 1, 1988,  in several  ways,  including  the
following:  1)  the tax  on imported  cigarettes  will  be cut  by two-thirds  (from
approximately  $1.50  to  approximately  $0.50);  all foreign  firms  will  be
permitted  to advertise  in certain  Korean  magazines  and to do specified  types
of sales  promotion  including  the  sponsoring  of promotional  events;  3) US firms
will  be allowed  to import  cigarettes  and  to sell  them independently  of the
Korean  Monopoly  Corporation;  4)  US cigarettes  will  be permitted  to  be sold in
all  retail  outlets  that  carry  Korean  brands.- 34 -




On Feb.  16,  1988,  the  American  Meat Institute  file.  a  petition  alleging
that the  Government  of Korea  maintained  a restrictive  licensing  system  on
imports  of bovine  meat,  in violation  of GATT  Article  XI.  The  petition  alleged
that since  May 21,  1985,  the  approval  of the  Government  of Korea  had been
required  for  each  shipment  of beef imported,  and  that  all  applications  had
been denied  except  for  a single  shipment  of 49 tons  imported  for the  annual
meetings  of the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank in Seoul.
Disposition
The  US had  already  consulted  with  Korea  under  this  matter  under  GATT
dispute  settlement  procedures. On May, 4, 1988,  The  GATT Council  established
a panel  on the  matter,  a  parallel  panel  on a similar  Korea  - Australia
dispute.
On May 27 the  Korea  - US panel  issued  a report  favorable  to the  US,  but
Korea  did not  agree  to Council  adoption  of the  report. USTR,  acting  authority
given  by "301,"  announced  on September  28 that if there  were  no substantial
movement  toward  a resolution  by mid-November,  a proposed  retaliation  list
would  be published.
On Nov. 8, 1989,  Korea  allowed  the  GATT  panel  report  to  be adopted,
consultations  began  to find  an acceptable  way  to implement  the  panel's
recommendations.  In  April  1990  letters  were exchanged  between  the
governments  of Korea  and the  United  States  setting  out  an agreed  mode of
implementation  of the  GAST  panel's  recommendations.  USTR  is monitoring
Korea's  implementation.- 35 -




On April  27, 19S8,  the  Wine Institute  and  the  Amsociation  of  American
Vintners  filed  a petition  complaining  of  policies  and  practices  of the  Korean
Government  that  unreasonably  deny  access  to the  Korean  wine  market.
Dlspositlon
After  consultations,  the  Government  of Korea  agreed,  in  January  1969,  to
provide  foreign  manufacturers  of wine  and  wine  products  non-discriminatory  and
equitable  access  to the  Korean  Market.
Sources:
US International  Trade  Commission  (annual)  various  issues.
US Trade  Representative  (1991a,  l991b,  1991c)- 36  -
Appendix  Table I
U.S.  Antldumping  and Countervailing  Duty Cases, 1980-1988
By Country and Outcome
(number  of cases)
Restrsklive  Total
Not  All
Country  VER  Other  Total  Restrictive  Cass
Developed  Coun
Australia  2  1  3  2  5
Autbia  8  0  8  2  10
Canada  7  12  19  16  35
Eumopen Community  181  35  196  108  304
Bhlum  17  3  20  7  27
Denmark  0  1  1  6  7
France  23  7  30  18  48
Germany  23  4  27  16  43
Greece  0  1  1  1  2
Ireland  0  1  1  5  6
Itaely  17  9  26  21  47
Luxembourg  13  1  14  5  19
Netherlands  10  3  13  v  22
Portugal  2  2  4  0  4
Spain  32  1  33  8  41
Unied Kingdom  22  2  24  10  34
EC Policies  2  0  2  2  4
Finland  4  0  4  0  4
Japan  15  19  34  15  49
New Zealand  0  4  4  5  9
Norway  0  0  0  2  2
South Africa  18  2  20  0  20
Sweden  0  5  5  3  8
Switzerland  0  0  0  7  7
Eastem European  Counties  26  7  33  5  38
Czechoslovakia  3  0  3  0  3
East Germany  4  2  6  2  8
Hungary  2  1  3  1  4
Poland  7  0  7  0  7
Romania  6  2  8  0  8
USSR  0  1  1  2  3
Yugoslavia  4  1  5  0  5- 37  -
Appendix  Table 1, continued
Restrictive  Total
Not  All
Country  VER  Other  Total  Restrictive  Cases
Developing  Countries
Argentina  0  6  6  5  11
Brazil  38  6  44  12  56
Chile  0  3  3  0  3
Chkn  3  10  13  3  16
Cdombba  0  4  4  4  8
CostsRica  0  3  3  0  3
Ecuador  0  2  2  0  2
El Salvador  0  0  0  2  2
Hong Kong  0  1  1  0  1
India  0  2  2  6  8
Indonesia  0  1  1  1  2
Iran  0  3  3  0  3
Israel  0  5  5  3  8
Kenya  0  1  1  0  1
Korea  26  5  31  5  36
Malaysia  0  1  1  1  2
Mexico  9  23  32  3  35
Pakistan  0  1  1  2  3
Panama  1  0  1  0  1
Peru  0  3  3  3  6
Philippines  0  3  3  2  5
Singapore  0  4  4  2  6
Sr Lanka  0  0  0  1  1
Taiwan  11  7  18  11  29
Thaiband  0  5  5  2  7
Tnnidad & Tobago  1  0  1  0  1
Turkey  0  5  5  2  7
Uruguay  0  1  1  0  1
Venezuela  18  2  20  1  21
Zimbabwe  0  1  1  0  1
Totals
Al  Countries  348  193  541  233  774
Developed  Countries  215  78  293  157  450
Developing  Countries  107  108  215  71  286
Eastern  European  Countries  26  7  33  5  38
Soure:  J.M. I-inger  and Tracy Murray, pp. 51-53.- 38  -
Appendix  Table 2
United  States  R301"  Cases,  July 1975  - July 1991
By Country  and Outcome
(number  of cases)
Oter
raet  Conry  raw  Amegw  Tami Cmaruv  Ltihwld  US  PAusew  PeaWbg
MA1110W  avI  w  row  R^^alt  09&ome
Deveoped Counties
Austria  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
Canada  7  1  0  2  2  1  2  1
Europen Community  29  a  9  3  12  6  1  4
Jan  12  0  8  3  11  0  1  0
Norway  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  0
Sweden  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0
Switzerlndt  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Developing  Countres
Argentina  5  0  3  0  3  1  0  1
Brazl  5  1  4  0  4  0  0  0
China, Peoples  Republic  2  0  1  0  1  0  0  1
Guatemal  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  0
India  4  0  1  0  1  0  0  3
Korea  8  0  5  2  7  1  0  0
Taiwan  5  2  3  0  3  0  0  0
Thailand  3  0  1  0  1  0  0  2
Eastem Europe
USSR  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
All Countrhls'
Number  of cases  86  11  35  12  47  10  5  12
(%  of total)  (100)  (13)  (41)  (14)  (55)  (12)  (6)  (14)
Developed  Countrese
Number  of cases  52  7  17  9  26  8  5  5
(% of total)  (100)  (13)  (33)  (17)  (50)  (15)  (10)  (10)
Developing  Countries
Number  of cases  33  3  18  3  21  2  0  7
(% of total  (100)  (9)  (55)  (9)  (64)  (6)  (0)  (21)
Developing  excd.  Korea
Number  of css  25  3  13  1  14  1  0  a
(% of total)  (100)  (12)  (52)  (4)  (56)  (4)  (0)  (24)
lorea
Number  of ces  8  0  5  2  7  1  0  0
(% of totao  (100)  (0)  (63)  (25)  (88)  (13)  (0)  (0)
Source:  Tabuated from Office of Ome  Unned  Sta  Tr  Ra  Preselys,  -section  301 Table of C;1aes1  ahingstnw
D.C., USTR,  August 15, 1991,  photocopied.
Note:  p/  In 1979  a US fim complied  about the Swiss  customs  sevic's  tes  of the gold  content  of eyela
frames. USTR  s  nveotgaton  reveld  hat US standards  for  sig  and man  gold content  wa
diflerent  from thoe used by many  other  countils.  The  US industry  agreed  to shift  to the more common
stndards  and maddngs  which  the Swiss  custorm servce  would  aoept  without  ther testg.  This acton
Is classified  as ibeizalon  by the US,w  and does  not fit ino any of the catgo  d in this table.Policy  Research Working  Paper Serles
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